Owen Gun Goes to Sea ? Part 2
The Commander-in-Chief’s Decision, Blame Blamey.
It would have been ordinary Military procedure for a decision to have been made by the Master General of Ordnance Branch on the type of guns to be produced. Probably as a result of the background of controversy and politics, it was decided that the decision should be made by the Commander-in-Chief, General Blamey, and all relevant information enabling him to arrive at his decision was to be furnished to him.
It would appear that about the end of February 1943, General Blamey advised the Cabinet that he did require additional supplies of submachine guns, that he could equally well use the Austen or the Owen, and as the Austen was much cheaper than the Owen he saw no reason for the Army to purchase the more expensive gun.
General Blamey, telling the troops that he lives on the same rations as they do, attempting to improve his P.R. and not look like a crooked Victorian Commissioner of Police, which was his last job, before they got sick of him.
Of course the men on the ground at the sharp end of it all disagreed completely but the only voice they had was when a letter sent to family members praising the Owen Gun and crying out desperately for more of them, were sent on and printed mainly anonymously in the local newspapers. Luckily there were enough of those letters printed to supply a large political counter weight to the politicians and generals, it is rare that the people are so well informed.
Once the politicians antenna feel public back lash like all insects they retreat into their hiding holes. So much so that eventually soldiers letters on the Owen Gun subject were censored and any further mentions were removed. That still left ‘Letter to the Editor’ from front line service men who had been injured or on leave so the truth continued to get out right to the end of the war. This is also additional evidence to show that the front line infantry were never supplied enough section firepower and not giving the man with his life on the line the best confidence builders that they needed.
As regards to the relative costs of the guns, it should be noted that the manufacturers of the Owen Gun had at no time been asked to reduce their gun to the minimum cost and of sacrificing such qualities as it possessed, and which were not possessed by the Austen. To provide a small example of this, it should be noted that the Owen magazine could carry 35 rounds as compared with 28 for the Austen; that the Owen is provided with a compensator and a 10″ barrel, whereas the Austen had no compensator and has an 8″ barrel. It would therefore appear that the cost comparison had never been carried out by the Army before this advice was tendered by General Blamey at a time when the Owen manufacturers had not even been consulted.
This cartoon seems to be pointed at General Blamey as General Muddle but the problem was more sinister than just muddle.
When General Blamey made the statement referred to above, there was no official information in the possession of the Department of the Army or the Department of Munitions as to the relative cost of the two guns. Investigation had been proceeding for some considerable time, and the cost for the Owen had been ascertained in December 1942 by the Cost Investigation Branch of the Ministry of Munitions. The figure arrived at was £9: 2: 0 for current production at the end of 1942, and the overall average figure was £10: 14: 6 since the beginning of production. Many cost establishing production had to be distributed to less guns in the individual orders. On the other hand, it was being freely stated in Army High Command circles that Austen costs were from a quarter to a half of the Owen cost, but there was in fact no basis or information for this comparison to be made by anyone at that time.
Although the Owen costs had been ascertained in December 1942, it had still been impossible up to the 18th March 1943 for the Ministry of Munitions to obtain a comparative figure from the manufacturers of the Austen. Mr. Jensen informed Mr. V.A. Wardell on the 18th March 1943 that the Cost Investigator was still working at Die Casters but up to date had not furnished his report.
Mr Jensen had the reputation of being the most intelligent Public Servant of the decade.
On the 18th March, Mr. V.A. Wardell telegraphed Senator Arnold asking for further information and stating that Mr. Jensen had no knowledge of the decision transmitted by Senator Arnold to continue the Owen project. Senator Arnold then saw the Minister for Munitions, who was surprised at this information, and as a result telephoned Mr. Jensen. As Mr. Jensen had no positive statement to make in the matter, it was then referred by Mr. Makin to Mr. Forde. Mr. Forde informed Mr. Makin and Senator Arnold that he had changed his mind. It had been decided to standardise on the Austen for all future production, and drop the Owen. ‘Some reference was made in the same conversation to the possibility of the U.S. Army using the Owen.’ However, as the Commander-in-Chief, General Blamey, appears to have held up the U.S. Army order pending a decision as to which gun was to be used by the Australian Army, there was very good reason to doubt the good faith of this remark.
Finding the right staff for firearm work is the number one priority once they are let go, you have to search the country for replacements and then you have to train them for the specific firearm task that they are to work on.
Just A Few Pennies More!
On the 19th March, Lysaght’s received word that there would be no further orders for the Owen Gun, and that the Australian Army would standardise on Austens. On what could this decision have been made? It was not on serviceability, nor on price; nor on production? At that time Twenty-two thousand (22,000) Owen Guns had been delivered as against a combined total for Die Casters and Carmichaels of about four thousand (4,000) Austens. Each week 600 Owen Guns were being delivered against 200 Austens. In any event later it was found that without counting the cost of setting up a much more expensive production process of die casting, which the government ultimately paid for, the Austens were only a few pennies cheaper than the Owen Gun for a much lessor product.
As Lysaght’s had to make a decision affecting the continuity of production at a number of important sub-contractors’ works as well as in their own Newcastle Works, repeated efforts were made to obtain information on the future of the project.
In the interest of the troops, Mr. V.A. Wardell (The general manager of Lysaghts, Port Kembla) took the only effective course open to him, and wrote to the Prime Minister, Mr. John Curtin, on the 5th April 1943, placing the whole position before him. V.A. Wardell was received by the Prime Minister in Canberra; he expressed great concern and said that the matter would be decided by the War Cabinet at a meeting in the next few days.
On these facts, Cabinet reversed the decision and acknowledged the Owen as the standard submachine gun for the Australian Forces. Two further orders, each for five thousand (5,000) guns, were later placed with Lysaght’s.
Owen Gun The Standard Australian Sub-Machine Gun
With the announcement that the Owen Gun was the standard submachine gun for the Australian Forces one would be forgiven for not presuming that production would continue until the end of the immediate hostilities, the end of war in the Pacific against Japan, but they were the last major orders and as all orders had been filled, production ceased in September 1944, by which time Lysaght’s had made 45,477 Owen Guns, over half a million magazines, and 600,000 component spares. All tools and jigs and full manufacturing details were packed up and forwarded to the Small Arms Factory, Lithgow, N.S.W., together with Gerald Wardells notes for future development. By September 1944 all that was left at Port Kembla was the archival history and an empty building.
- Owen Gun Trigger pack Cutaway.
The Owen Gun Annexe at Port Kembla was an arsenal capable of producing 2000 guns a week even though it had never been popular with the Army’s High Command. The continued egotistical rejection of the most successful firearm of the day was a well documented part of Australians war history. It was known then and it is known now. Why, in wartime, when the hazards of war are always in the balance and no one knows what the next move of the enemy could be, would the government close an arsenal that produces what your soldiers want most?
If the factory had exceeded production and filled all needs for the three Armies of the Australian Commonwealth, the factory could have been ‘moth balled’ production line left in tact, in case it was needed, with all the tools left in place. No, this was a very definite decision. Many would think maybe they had something better on hand. That is not true either. As well as it being tested and found to be the best in the world, it was also officially in service until 1966 and Australian soldiers were still using them at the end of 1967 in Vietnam.
What had happened?
On the 14th August 1944 a “Most Secret”,War Crimes Commission was held, “In Camera”, in Melbourne, before his Honour Sir William Webb and it continued until the 31 August 1944. Evidence was taken from witnesses, many questions were asked concerning the lighting on the ship, sightings of a submarine after the sinking and personal affects lost by the survivors, but no investigation or questions as to what cargo the ship was carrying or why there was a dispute on the number of people on board the vessel at the time of its sinking.
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